My philosophy - a summary



My philosophy – a short summary



Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.



1. Philosophy – according to its original European paradigms – is a Socratic enterprise, i.e. a mostly cognitive, reflective, dialectic, communicative and cooperative search for the truth about human beings and their place in the universe. However, human beings do not only make factual statements, but also aesthetic and ethical, moral and political, philosophical and religious statements. Therefore the truth that philosophers are striving for cannot be understood only in a narrow positivist or even only scientific manner, but must encompass all important human affairs.



2. My approach to philosophy is critical in a Kantian sense, i.e. neither sceptic in denying the possi-bility of achieving objective knowledge about human beings and the world nor dogmatic starting from metaphysical beliefs about God, the soul and the world. It attempts to be compatible with scientific methods as much as possible. Nevertheless, philosophy is a cognitive enterprise sui generis and cannot be reduced to any formal, empirical or theoretical science. Furthermore, my approach to philosophy is primarily methodological and holistic in an Hegelian sense, i.e. philosophy is neither basically or primarily logics nor semantics nor epistemology nor transcendental analysis or phenomenology, but based on complex and manifold reflections involving logical, semantic, cognitive, epistemological, phenomenological, pragmatic, ontological and metaphysical reflections.


3. Philosophy is the opposite of any ideology as a non-dialectic way of thinking about human beings and their place in the universe being based on prejudice, overly simple or even false principles. Philosophy is a rigorous and a self-critical common search for objective truth and evident principles. Therefore, it is more than just a personal or common world view (Weltanschauung), but a common intellectual inquiry searching for insights into the basic structures of the human mind and for some self-transcendent understanding of the most fundamental ontological structures of the world. Unlike the adherents of ideologies, philosophers accept cognitive aporias (sokratische Unwissenheit), even as they seek some reliable synthetic conceptions and synoptic models nevertheless.


4. Philosophy cannot be satisfied with theoretical philosophy alone, but must also compass practical and even poietical philosophy as well, as at first suggested and realized by Aristotle. Neither can practical philosophy be reduced to theoretical philosophy as in some forms of pre-Socratic meta-physics or as in some modern forms of positivism and naturalism, phenomenology or existentialism. Nor can theoretical philosophy be reduced to practical philosophy as in some forms of pragmatism. Finally, poietic philosophy cannot be reduced to either of them because it is unifying theoretical knowledge and practical insights by creating new artefacts, events and processes in complex situations and structures of the world (Lebenswelt).


5. Any philosophy necessarily starts with one's own personal existence in the common world of every-day life, and therefore starts with common sense, but it is not dogmatic in defending it only, because common sense is always formed and partially distorted by some blind spots and inadequacies of the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist). My approach is Kantian in the sense that philosophy cannot be satisfied with making explicit the implicit assumptions of common sense only, but it is anti-Hegelian in the sense that philosophy is neither merely an expression of the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist) nor the last culmination of the spirit of the world (Weltgeist) moving through history of mankind.


6. My philosophizing has achieved some metaphysical insights into the most fundamental ontological structures of the world after many years of participating in analytic, phenomenological and herme-neutic discussions. At best, it is called a form of critical realism that rejects and argues against all forms of metaphysical monism, such as naturalism and materialism or phenomenalism and idealism. My philosophizing has also achieved some epistemological insights into the cognitive potentials of the human mind after many years in rejecting along the lines of Kantian critical philosophy not only all forms of Scepticism and Dogmatism, Empiricism and Rationalism, but also the logical empiricism or positivism of early analytic philosophy as well as all forms of (transcendental) phenomenology denying the possibility of rational ontology and descriptive metaphysics.


7. In my philosophy, I hold and defend a holistic anthropological conception of the human person as a dynamic personal unity of body, soul and mind. Each human being begins to exist as a new and biologically independent psycho-somatic individual with its birth and ends with its death as a complex and manifold personal unity of body, soul and mind. Thus, although I reject the Platonic view of an immortal soul or an eternal spirit within human beings surviving corporeal death, I accept the Aristo-telian, Cartesian and Kantian conception of an immaterial intellect (noûs – intellectūs – Vernunft) that is with regards to content not fully determined by the dynamic and interactive unity of the human body and soul. Therefore, I also reject naturalist or materialist reductionism according to which the human mind and "the I" are nothing but a function or product of bio-electro-chemical processes within the biographically and socially conditioned human brain. The human soul with its emerging internal cognitive, motivational, emotional and sensual faculties is not merely a function of the subjective human living body (Leib) or even of the objective biological organism (Körper). Similarly, the human mind and the “I” with their various mental activities and emergent forms of consciousness are not only epiphenomena or mere functions of the human brain and its nervous system. They are emerging mental forces of potentially autopoietic and with regards to content independent meaningful “software”, although functionally and energetically dependent on the biological “hardware” of the physiological brain and its subpersonal bio-electro-chemical processes. As a person I can use some of my immaterial conscious thoughts and intentions to rearrange and reshape some of the circuits and activities of my brain in diverse learning processes. Hence, I am not a mere passive product of my brain – neither of the more stable neurophysiological “hardware” of my brain nor of the more plastic already established neurological channels and trails in the neuronal processes of my brain nor of my own current and fluid cognitive and motivational “software” activities in my brain. Rather, although my brain carries my mind, I can conduct my mind and by doing so I can also to some extent change and reform some neurological processes in my own brain.


8. In my philosophy I hold and defend a strong non-reductionist philosophy of mind and spirituality

in accordance with Karl Jaspers, Nicolai Hartmann and Carl Gustav Jung. Language as the faculty to communicate and think in complex combinations of words synthesized according to socially acquired semantic intuitions and rules of syntax is based on the unique human ability to generate and under-stand abstract concepts largely independent from the immediate behavioural setting and concrete circumstances. Animals and plants are not able to communicate in these ways and we do not know of any other intelligent living beings on our planet Earth or in the observable universe who also share these capacities. However, the human mind is not only based on linguistic abilities, but also on various other psychological abilities, such as sensation, motivation, emotion, intuition, remembrance, antici-pation, self-consciousness, self-reflection, self-knowledge, symbolization and idealization. Therefore, the human mind is a very complex, but also highly vulnerable living mental force based on the dynamic human soul and carried by the organic human body of an individual person among other persons. All human cultures have brought about some kind of spirituality mostly bound up with their religions based on narrative mythologies and pictorial symbols and sometimes also bound up with philosophies based on abstract systems of ideals, principles, values and norms.


9. In my philosophy, I hold and defend a compatibilist conception of the contingent possibility of a socially learned psychological faculty of freedom of the will in accordance with Karl Jaspers and Nicolai Hartmann. This faculty belongs to healthy minded persons in thinking, speaking, judging, deciding and acting on the basis of some actual personal realm of potentially conflicting motivations. This contingent personal faculty of free will is weaker or stronger dependent on the personality and character of a person as acquired in the course of life, and it can be slightly infected by the personality, severely damaged by bad habits or even completely lost by loosing mental health, as in various forms of psychopathological illnesses, such as addiction, depression, mania, obsession, paranoia, schizo-phrenia, etc. Hence, freedom of the will is not a timeless necessary psychological reality independent of the life and circumstances of a person, but a contingent and acquired faculty which comes in several grades of inner freedom since it is dependent on the complex and dynamic structure of the personality and the life story of a person. While the body, brain and its nervous system work according to inborn vital functions and culturally acquired habits, they are in constant interaction with other people and various circumstances in the world and they can respond to art, film and music, communication, education and information, medication, psychotherapy and neuromodulation, landscape, climate and weather, etc. However, adults have learned to choose, discriminate, value and respond to other people and various circumstances in the world in a personal manner. Hence, they may not always have a free will with respect to the motivational drives of their innate vital functions and culturally acquired habits, but they may have a free will to veto them to some extent, when they think to have good reasons or decide intuitively that it is ethically adequate or morally required.


10. In my philosophy I hold and defend a complex general philosophical ethics based on (a.) cardinal virtues (or good habits), such as prudence, justice, moderation and courage (Plato and Aristotle) combined with (b.) some pragmatic axioms of rational choice (Brentano), (c.) some vital or instinctive value preferences, e.g. for life and health, knowledge and liberty, joy and happiness, self-love and love of ones relatives and friends, (d.) moral duties of self-perfection and benevolence towards other human beings (Kant), and (e.) some highest moral principles, like respect for personal dignity (Kant)or the Golden Rule, that are independent of religious beliefs about the will of God. Since the central and ultimate cognitive virtue is phronesis or the faculty of intuitive judgement (Urteilskraft)(Kant) from the standpoint of an impartial spectator (Adam Smith) this ethics is a form of situation ethics which leaves choices in concrete situations (of ethical and moral conflicts) partially to the free choice and responsi-bility of individual persons. In this way general ethics is compatible with a large variety of different forms of professional ethics, such as economic, juridical, medical or political ethics. Since nobody is perfect, all human beings have to learn by making mistakes and are bound to become guilty. Therefore, the Judeo-Christian virtues of faith, love and hope need to be incorporated into philosophical ethics in order to fulfil the deep human longing not only for truth and justice, but also for forgiveness, mercy and atonement.


11. In my philosophy I hold and defend a complex philosophy of law based on an ethics of law (Kant and Brentano). Each positive or established given law can be good or bad, i.e. morally fair or unfair, ethi-cally just or unjust, pragmatically effective or ineffective, etc.. Therefore, any legal system should contain a coherent maximum of good laws, i.e. at best only fair, just and effective laws. Since nature and societies are changing in history, no legal and established system of laws can be perfect and adequate forever. Therefore, all legal systems as institutions based on cultural traditions and social conventions need constant reforms by correcting and improving the established system of laws. However, any adequate, decent and coherent system of laws has to realize some timeless and universal legal ideals in order to give decent orientation to the general legal system of a concrete legal state, such as justice and humanity, freedom and equality of citizens before the law, pragmatic security and effectiveness, etc.. Moreover, any good system of laws incorporate some higher categorical principles of legislation and jurisdiction such as, e.g. no arbitrary laws, no punishment without a law, no guilt without responsi-bility, no responsibility without freedom of choice, guilt is individual, no legal sentence without a fair trial, no fair trial without a lawyer, no self administered justice, no legitimate power against people and goods unless legally executed by organs of the legal state, etc. These legal ideals and categorical principles of legislation and jurisdiction have a dignified and higher constitutional status and have to be safeguarded from ordinary legal reforms through the legislative powers of democratically elected governments and parliaments and are subject to higher legal organs of the legal state, such as constitutional courts and their interpretation of the constitution, their legislation and jurisdiction, only.


12. In my philosophy I hold and defend the political philosophy of a social-ecological liberal-conser-vatism that strives for the goal of realizing equal chances for acquiring, learning, practising and exhibiting personal freedom of the will and action in the long run and ultimately, at best, for all human beings. However, under the real-life conditions and the remaining limits of social, economic and political life equal chances for the greatest possible number of human beings can only be achieved by common efforts of a large manifold of concrete, diverse and effective centres of economic, political and governmental activities on our common planet earth. The best political system to achieve this highest political goal is a modern nation with a parliamentary democracy, a legal state and a social market economy (pragmatic ordo-liberalism as opposed to dysfunctional neoliberalism). Democratic govern-ments requisite the political power and strong legal institutions in order to safeguard the presumed best interest of the nation and the democratic will of the people. The national market, the common public infrastructure and the natural conditions of future life need to be conserved by sufficient regulations of the global, federal and local market. Civil rights and human rights should be guaranteed by a modern constitution and a legal state free from corruption, from the political domination of the democratic majority and from economic lobbying. The constitution and the legal state should not be fully subject to the influence of the strongest party and to the will of the government, but be respected as being largely above party politics and particular interests.


13. In my philosophy I hold and defend a complex post-Kantian and post-Hegelian conception of philosophical aesthetics and the arts. Aesthetic judgements about what is beautiful or ugly, sublime or kitschy, holy or profane, fascinating or horrifying seem to be very subjective, depending on the personality, character and temperament, cultural background and education of people. Emotional judgements about what someone finds pleasant or unpleasant, tasty or disgusting, exciting or boring, comic or tragic, funny or sad, etc. definitely are very subjective, but they do not only depend on the personality, character and temperament, cultural background and education of individual people, but sometimes also on deeper affective responses and even vital instincts common across human cultures and social groups. Kant was basically right that aesthetic judgements about nature or about cultural artefacts are largely indifferent with respect to personal interest in the object (interesseloses Wohl-gefallen) and usually imply an expectation of agreement by others. Nevertheless, aesthetic judgements can be reflected in good education and refined by cultivation, because conceptual differentiation in describing and evaluating aesthetic phenomena can be learned from a reliable tradition of qualified examples and proven paradigms which have stood the test of times. Hence, the faculty of aesthetic judgement (Urteilskraft) must not be considered to be subjective in the sense of being completely relative and without any reliable common and communicable standards. There may be well educated critics and proven experts in various fields who have learned to judge well about cultural artefacts by their refined intuitions and who are also able to justify their judgements with good reasons among other critics or experts in the same field. Nevertheless, there is no absolute or only commonly accepted hierarchy of the arts, as Hegel claimed, and there is no absolute judge or judgement in aesthetic matters about nature, cultural artefacts or the arts. This is why in modern societies the arts and cultural arte-facts tend to fall prey to changing fashion, to political ideologies or to the current market. Moreover, they tend to become mere commodities and signals of group identity and social status. In this way they tend to loose their original status and inherent value as works of art and their special aura. Therefore, in modern societies religions, confessions and other identity groups need to defend their common aesthetic standards and emotional preferences – together with their faith, ethics and world view – against the inclinations and prejudices of the masses, against post-modern individualism and against economic totalitarianism. (Theodor W. Adorno & Pierre Bourdieu)



14. In my philosophy, I hold and defend a pan-en-theist conception of God as the ultimate ground and seemingly intelligent being which created the whole universe expanding in space-time, of the evo-lution of life on earth in natural history and of the evolution of human beings as intelligent living beings in cultural history. Hence, God is an all-encompassing and eternal, immutable and necessary, self-reliant and perfect being, which is separate from the contingent and largely intelligible spatio-temporal world, but which is not identical with all things, with nature or with the world, as in various forms of pantheism. However, the contingent world depends on God and exists in God and because of the infinite creative and sustaining power of God. As the creator of the whole of humanity, God trans-cends all cultures, religions and confessions. The problem of theodicy, e.g. of how to reconcile common theistic conceptions of God as an all-mighty and all-knowing personal being who is kind (i.e. loving, just, benevolent and merciful) at the same time is mainly solved by overcoming supranatural, mytho-logical and anthropomorphic conceptions of God. In this way pan-en-theism is compatible with the best current scientific theories of the beginning of the universe (based on the universal and self-evident principle of ex nihilo nihil fit), with the still mysterious emergence of life on Earth, with the still not sufficiently understood evolution of intelligent life on Earth and of the rise of the cultural evolution of homo sapiens.


15. Since philosophy is mainly a cognitive enterprise and essentially a reflecting search for truth allowing for deep aporias, methodological scepticism and tough questions, it is neither a rival nor a substitute for a religious faith, as e.g. the Jewish, Christian or Islamic faith. These religious faiths are considered to be based on some revelation speaking to the hearts and minds of its truthful believers and therefore essentially different from rational philosophy. Since they entail some truth claims, as e.g. about God as a personal being and about Jesus (Yeschuah or Isa), that are essential for their central beliefs, but mutually incompatible, philosophers have to make up their minds about them when confronted with them. However, this is exactly the moment where philosophy ends and where theology begins.


Heidelberg, October 31th 2019